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Working with Justice Blackmun exposed some habits a New Yorker could
learn to share. He loved politics, baseball, 8 a.m. breakfasts, afternoons in the
library editing opinions with freshly sharpened pencils, and evenings at home
with Dottie. He lingered over stories of his days at Harvard, as launch driver
in the Harvard-Yale race, surprised to be invited to a yacht party for the
winning crew, and as law student marveling at Felix Frankfurter's cadenzas in
the classroom.
Justice Blackmun ran a friendly chambers on the south side of the
Supreme Court building, between those of Justices Powell and Douglas,
smiling as a messenger cooked fragrant Thai food on a hot plate in the clerks'
room, tolerant as we smuggled friends into the Court to play ball in the
upstairs gym. He was intellectually generous to his clerks, complimenting us
on memos or drafts, treating our arguments as serious offerings, arriving back
from the Court's conference each week to share how the votes had gone. But
he also kept his own counsel. In the Bakke case,' where the future of
educational affirmative action programs was at stake, the Justice arrived at
breakfast one spring morning and announced that he hoped we would not be
too disappointed by his decision to reverse.
He was amused at the politics of the Court, announcing from time to time
that he was "in the doghouse" with the Chief, who had assigned him some
uplifting opinion to write, enjoying even as he understood his courtship by
Justice Brennan. He did not like going head to head in verbal jousts with his
colleagues, and didn't mask his personal engagement in his opinions. He was
unstudied, a New Yorker might say, but really he was so much more.
Justice Blackmun was a son of the Middle West, and an early claim in our
constitutional history and culture is that the West has something distinct to say.
The astonishing fertility of the land asks a fertility of mind. The intricate
remedies of English and coastal common law might suit professional and
monied men, but not plain people who farm or work as mechanics. Books of
Law French or Law English were unavailable in a new country, and tangent
to its problems. The rigor of inherited law was to be limited by a natural
equity, adapting it to America's more generous situation.
" Professor of Law, Yale Law School: Law Clerk to Justice Blackmnun. October ern 1977
I. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke. 438 U S 265 (1978)
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An early Kentucky writer captured something of this. To codify American
law is an impossible task, said Charles Humphreys to the Kentucky Institute
in 1824. A new Justinian would have to "go in person from state to state to
inform himself' 2 of the spirit of the new jurisprudence, and by the time he
had come round, it would have changed again. The creative task for American
lawyers and judges was to cobble a republican law from precedent, political
theory, the Enlightenment's law of nature and nations in a cosmopolitan
tradition, and, necessarily, from the practical situation of the states. An
American law of liberty was not static or frozen, but required sensibility,
reflection, and experiment. "[G]reat inroads were necessarily made" in the
traditional common law.3 The sanguinary criminal law of England, for
example, with fierce punishments for small offenses, did not fit men's high
hopes in America. In the West, as Gilbert Imlay said, "we feel that dignity
nature bestowed upon us at the creation .. .
Bringing legitimacy to the task of shaping a new law was less problematic
for the Founders than it is today. Judges remained conscious that their
authority ran in two channels, one of rule, and one of exception, both law and
equity. And for Americans, equity was not limited to the systematizations of
a Hardwicke or an Eldon. Rather, equity was seen through the eyes of a
Kaimes, as a continuing spring of remedy, ever young, providing recourse and
writ when on particular facts the law cut too harshly against a person of
limited capacity or moral innocence. The formalism of rules, statutory or
common law, was moderated by equity's exceptional power. Our more recent
constitutional history reflects this critique of law as applied: Equity's leaven
is nearly homomorphic with our own category of due process.
For the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a jurisprudence based on
natural moral sense had a broad provenance. Equity would not bring anarchy
or inequality of treatment to a normative system. It was a method of
accommodating the latent defect of every rule, the unanticipated case in which
application was unreasonable. Equity would not vary according to whimsy or
taste, but was guided by a faculty of judgment that converged among men. The
skepticism of David Hume and his devotees was cured, for Americans, by
"common sense"-philosophers such as Thomas Reid and Adam Ferguson,
whose works were widely read and taught. The proposition that men possessed
a natural moral capacity for judgment, even without positive rules, was
attractive to a revolutionary society that had once overthrown old rules.
Indeed, the same acceptance of naturalism informed the original
constitutional debate over texts and rights. A bill of rights was not necessary
2. C. Humphreys, A Sketch of the Science of Law in the United States, Ky. REPORTER, June 21, 1824,
at I.
3. Id.
4. GIL3ERT IMLAY, Letters from Kentucky, in A TOPOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF TtIE WESTERN
TERRITORY OF NORTH AMERICA 28 (London, J. Debrett, 3d ed. 1797).
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to many, because rights do not depend on a contractual rule of specialty.
Formal covenantal writings were only one manifestation of the sense of
propriety and reason in which rights were grounded. The principles of natural
justice and republican philosophy framed and limited the powers of
government itself. This untethering from text was not alarming, because men
lived within a culture, and relied on sensibility.
For those who prefer a static Constitution, it is instructive to remember
how these early generations viewed the evolving judgments of equity.
Apprehension of natural justice would change in the "'progress of society, and
in the course of practice, . . . by ripeness of discernment and growing delicacy
of sentiment." 5 Equity was not a fixed or static system, at least epistemically.
Equity, as soulmate to law, was a powerful agent, overcoming even the texts
of legislatures. So much a conservative as James Kent noted. "Courts (arel
bound to give such a construction to a statute as (is] consistent with justice,
though contrary to the letter of it." Henry Home, Lord Kaimes, popular on
the frontier among the Scotch-Irish, confided:
The power of a court of equity, to redress the injustice of common
law ... with respect to statutes, is founded on the same principle, viz.
that there ought to be a remedy for every wrong .... ITIhe words of
a statute correspond not always to the will of the legislature; and...
the things enacted prove not always proper means to answer the end
in view .... [H]ence the necessity of a court of equity, to redress the
injustice of courts of common law with respect to statutes, as well as
with respect to deeds and covenants.7
These brief excursions into time, distance, and equity are not meant to
distract, but rather to hint at what Justice Blackmun may be about. In the spirit
of American law, he has been skeptical of theory and char) of wordsmiths
who suppose that a three-part test or formal system will capture history, nature.
or understanding. He often has suggested that the facts speak for themselves,
preferring the modest steps of induction, searching the particular for a compass
direction, but not inclined to announce the end state. The federal courts were
conceived, let us not forget, as courts of equity and law.
The thought of American lawyers in the early nineteenth century, that they
were bound to draw upon natural moral sense in relation to the facts as a key
supplement to precedent and rule, is one that Justice Blackmun has shared in
5. LORD KAIMES IHENRY HOMEI. PRINCIPLES Ot EQL ITY i\ (Edinburgh. A Kincaid 1760)
6. Dash v. Van Kleeck. 7 Johns. 477. 502 (N Y. Sup. Ct 1810) temphasi. added). r'- fliam %
M'Claws, I S.C.L. (I Bay) 93, 98 (Super. Ct. 1793) ("[Sltaute, passed against the plain and ob .iou,,
principles of common nght. and common reason, are absolutel null and \oid. a sjar m the% t'i calr huttled
to operate against those principles.... we are . . . bound to gi.e such a construction to (the stitutel. as
will be consistent with justice, and the dictates of natural reason, though contrar% to the strict letter ot the
law.").
7. LORD KAIMES IHENRY HOME). supra note 5, at 124-25
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his jurisprudence. It is also an unspoken agenda of American legal realism.
Realism was not merely a destructive project, as some have supposed. Rather,
it was also an exercise for those with naturalist proclivities, founded on the
premise that in hard study of the facts one might discern shared moral
truths-that in reconstructing American law we must trust, finally, the
discipline of the heart, moral understanding, and common culture, as much as
the contradictory strains of precedent and case.
Justice Blackmun's most important work on the Supreme Court has been
as the voice of exception, of equity as relief from hardened rule, asking why
we should rebuff a claim of injury. The heart of his work has been the strength
of the moral counterexample-asking how a system of law can be impregnable
if it has overlooked the claims of the weak, of the heterogenous, of the
disenfranchised.
In this, his character is his strength. He has a Shaker plainness; his brevity
speaks of the snares of rationalization. He recognized the danger that
triumphant majorities can overlook human truths. His opinions included an
occasional phrase that his brethren spurned as sentimental or emotional, yet
that is the reader's token that the relationship of judge to party is not
abstracted, but calls for a law sufficiently keen to do justice in the particular
case.
8
Justice Blackmun has spoken plainly of things we are reluctant to see. That
racial antipathy and condescension are still present in American society, and
that shifting burdens of proof can be a convenient way of grandfathering our
advantage. That women face lives of great difficulty, trying to balance the
claims of family against the demands of work and profession. That prisons,
necessary as a place to confine men of violence, are a Kantian hell. That the
state, in awarding children to one parent's custody, precludes other adults from
intervening, and takes on some responsibility to assure the child is not abused.
That many of our colleagues, cousins, and friends, including people of great
creativity and heart, have found themselves in relationships that do not
conform to the ordinary models of family. That the desire to serve one's
country extends to many types of people, including those who are asked by
their religion to wear a token of clothing such as a yarmulke, and that the state
cannot lightly ask one to forswear God in order to support one's country. That
fact finding in criminal trials and in capital cases is humanly fallible, and
maxims about the need for finality and the crucial stage of the trial cannot
8. Aristotle writes in The Rhetoric that there are three ways a lawyer may hope to persuade his
audience. The first is the ethos of the speaker. "We believe good men more fully and more readily than
others," says Aristotle. ARISTOTLE, THE RHETORIC, bk. I, ch. 2, in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
2155 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). "ITIhe personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes... to his
power of persuasion." Id. The second is pathos, an engagement of the audience in empathy, deploying the
evocative power of the facts as the stimulus to a natural justice. Aristotelian pathos does not lumber under
the connotation of the modern word. The third is nomos, or the logical argument in the form of syllogism.
Justice Blackmun has allowed his audience these independent routes to understanding.
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change this fallibility. The Justice has appropriately reminded us that
procedural default and the time limits on a motion for a new trial are a plain
poor excuse for executing a person where there is substantial newly developed
doubt about actual guilt.
Professor Henry Monaghan of the Columbia Law School wrote an
influential essay some years ago, suggesting that much of the activity of the
Supreme Court in constitutional interpretation should be seen as akin to
common law.9 The specification of rules and remedies in criminal cases, such
as the detailed rules for search and seizure and interrogation, and the
exclusionary rule that enforces them, draws on the courts' traditional
competence in creating common law.
I would propose in turn, that the other side of Supreme Court activity is
a constitutional equity. It is not static, it is not slave to text, it will change in
the "progress of society, and in the course of practice, . . . by ripeness of
discernment and growing delicacy of sentiment."'" It is the law that makes
exception, from procedure, from rule, when injustice would result. Justice
Blackmun's Constitution is cousin to Lord Kaimes' power of equity. And
beyond dispute, Justice Harry Andrew Blackmun has been a most worthy
Chancellor.
9. Henry P. Monaghan. The Supreme Court. 1974 Tenrn-Foreu crd. Catutttuuz Common Lmu. 89
HARV. L. REV. I (1975).
10. LORD KAIMES IHENRY HOME]. supra note 5. at iv
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